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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

During the month that has elapsed since the last issue of The Journal
Accountancy five treasury decisions have been made, all of which are
worthy of careful consideration.
At a time like this, when there is considerable agitation for the repeal
of the excess-profits-tax law; for the deferring of payment of the December
15th instalment of federal tax, and for a new law to take the place of the
excess-profits-tax law, it behooves accountants to remember that even if
the excess-profits-tax law should be repealed in 1921, the old law will apply
to the years 1909 to 1920, inclusive, and therefore the decisions handed down
by the various authorities will have important bearing upon every enterprise
involved thereby for many years to come.
The decisions that are published in The Journal of Accountancy this
month cover a varied field and all are interesting.
Number 3076 amends those articles appertaining to depletion of timber
and promulgates two new articles (236 and 237), in which are laid down
rules for “aggregating timber and land values for purposes of valuation”
and the accounting that is required by the department in cases of depletion
of timber.
The methods of valuation, nature of proof thereof, method of deter
mination of unit value and the application of said unit value in determination
of amount of depletion are set forth in clear, understandable terms in this
decision.
It is doubtful, however, whether there are many concerns engaged in
lumbering operations whose accounting history is complete enough to make
it possible to comply with the requirements of the department. Those who
revise their books and records to fit them to show the information required
will have made at least that part of their business appertaining to valuation
and depletion up to date. Those whose records have been kept in a manner
to show the facts required by the department will know that their accounts
and records are comprehensive and in line with the best accounting prac
tice. Those whose records will not show these data will do well to bring
their appraisals, accounts and other records into line.
District Judge Knox, of the district court of the United States for the
southern district of New York, handed down a decision in which is con
tained interesting information of that which constitutes gross income of
“every insurance company by whatever name they are called.” He con
cludes that premium deposits made in advance by members of mutual
insurance companies to cover estimated losses and expenses, so long as the
payment thereof constitutes the consideration for contract of insurance,
constitutes gross income.
This decision will make it necessary for this kind of insurance company
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to estimate its losses and expenses with greater accuracy if it is to avoid
paying a tax on a transaction that has been generally considered to be one
for mutual protection and not for profit.
Treasury decision 3080 relates to excess-profits taxation of a partnership
under the law of 1916-17, and, while its application is perhaps to the specific
case of which it treats, it is also indicative of what must be present in a
partnership return to segregate isolated transactions of the individual part
ners from those that may be said to constitute a “single trade or business.”
Article 42 of regulations 45 is amended by treasury decision 3082, more
clearly to define what constitute sales of personal property on the instalment
plan.
Treasury decision 3089 has to do with depletion allowance in case of dis
covery of a valuable deposit of mineral, oil or gas.
The provisions of this decision are such as to define the rights to such
value, for depletion purposes, as between lessor and lessee. It provides that
the value so discovered be apportioned between lessor and lessee.

TREASURY RULINGS

(T. D. 3076, October 5, 1920)
Income tax.

Depletion of timber

Articles 228, 229, 230, 231, 233, 234 and 235 of regulations No. 45 amended
and articles 236 and 237 inserted
Articles 228, 229, 230, 231, 233, 234 and 235 of regulations No. 45 are
hereby amended and articles 236 and 237 are promulgated, as follows :
Art. 228. Capital recoverable through depletion allowance in the case
of timber.—In general, the capital remaining in any year recoverable
through depletion allowances may be determined as indicated in articles 202
and 203. In the case of leases the apportionment of deductions between
the lessor and lessee will be made as specified in article 204. The cost of
timber properties shall be determined in accordance with the principles
indicated in article 205. For method of determining fair market value and
quantity of timber, see articles 234, 235 and 236. For depletion purposes the
cost of the timber shall not include any part of the cost of the land.
Art. 229. Computation of allowance for depletion of timber for given
year.—The allowance for depletion of timber in any taxable year shall be
based upon the number of units of timber felled during the year and the unit
value of the timber in the timber account or accounts pertaining to the
timber cut. The unit value of the timber for a given timber account in a
given year shall be the quotient obtained by dividing (a) the total number
of units of timber on hand in the given account at the beginning of the
year plus the number of units acquired during the year plus (or minus)
the number of units required to be added (or deducted) by way of correct
ing the estimate of the number of units remaining available in the account
into (b) the total fair market value as of March 1, 1913, and (or) cost
of the timber on hand at the beginning of the year, plus the cost of the
number of units acquired during the year, plus proper additions to capital
(see art. 231). The amount of the deduction for depletion in any taxable
year with respect to a given timber account shall be the product of (a)
the number of units of timber cut from the given account during the year
multiplied by (b) the unit value of the timber for the given account for
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the year. Those taxpayers who keep their accounts on a monthly basis
may, at their option, keep their depletion accounts on a monthly basis, in
which case the amount deductible on account of depletion for a given month
will be determined in the manner outlined above for a given year. The
total amount of the deduction for depletion in any taxable year shall be the
sum of the amounts deductible for the several timber accounts. For de
scription of timber accounts see articles 235 and 236.
The depletion of timber takes place at the time the timber is felled.
Since, however, it is not ordinarily practicable to determine the quantity of
timber immediately after felling, depletion for purposes of accounting will
be treated as taking place at the time when, in the process of exploitation,
the quantity of timber is first definitely determined.
Art. 230. Revaluation of timber not allowed.—In the case of timber
acquired prior to March 1, 1913, the fair market value as of that date shall,
when determined and approved by the commissioner, be the basis for deter
mining the depletion deduction for each year during the continuance of the
ownership under which the fair market value of the timber was fixed, and
during such ownership there shall be no redetermination of the fair market
value of the timber for such purpose. However, the unit market (or cost)
value of the timber will subsequently be changed if from any cause such unit
market (or cost) value, if continued as a basis of depletion, shall upon
evidence satisfactory to the commissioner be found inadequate or excessive
for the extinguishment of the cost, or fair market value as of March 1, 1913,
of the timber.
Art. 231. Charges to capital and to expenses in the case of timber.—
In the case of a timber property held for future operation by an owner
having no substantial income from the property or from other sources, all
expenditures for administration, protection, and other carrying charges
prior to production on a normal basis shall be charged to capital account ;
after such a property is on a normal production basis such expenditures
shall be treated as current operating expenses. In case a taxpayer, who has
a substantial income from other sources, owns a timber property which is
not yet on a normal production basis, he may, at his option, charge such
expenditures with respect to such timber property to capital, or treat them
as current operating expenses, but whichever system is adopted must be
followed until permission to change to the other system is secured from the
commissioner. In the case of timber operations all expenditures prior to
production for plants, improvements and equipment, and thereafter all
major items of plant and equipment, shall be charged to capital account for
purposes of depreciation. After a timber operation has been developed and
equipped and has reached its normal output capacity, the cost of additional
minor items of equipment and the cost of replacement of minor items of
worn-out and discarded plant and equipment may be charged to current
operating expenses, unless the taxpayer elects to write off such expenditures
through charges for depreciation; however, the method adopted must be
followed consistently from year to year.
Art. 232. Not changed.
Art. 233. Information to be furnished by taxpayer claiming depletion
of timber.—To the income-tax return of the taxpayer claiming a deduction
for depletion or depreciation or both there shall be attached a map and
statement (form T-Timber) for the taxable year covered by the income-tax
return. Form T-Timber requires the following: (a) map showing timber
and land acquired, timber cut, and timber and land sold; (b) description
of, cost of, and terms of purchase or lease of, timber and land acquired;
(c) proof of profit or loss from sale of capital assets; (d) description of
timber with respect to which claim for loss, if any, is made; (e) record of
timber cut; (f) changes in each timber account as the result of purchase,
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sale, cutting, re-estimate, or loss; (g) changes in physical property accounts
as the result of additions to or deductions from capital and depreciation:
(h) operation data with respect to raw and finished materials handled and
inventoried; (i) unit production costs, and (j) any other data which will be
helpful in determining the reasonableness of the depletion and (or) de
preciation deductions claimed in the return. Similar information is re
quired for certain years prior to the 1919 taxable year from those tax
payers who have not already furnished it. The specific nature of the in
formation required for the earlier years is given in detail in form T-general
forest industries questionnaire for the years prior to 1919.
Art. 234. Determination of fair market value of timber.—Where the
fair market value of the property at a specified date, in lieu of the cost
thereof, is the basis for depletion and depreciation deductions, such value
shall be determined, subject to approval or revision by the commissioner
upon audit, by the owner of the property in the light of the most reliable
and accurate information available with reference to the condition of the
property as it existed at that date, regardless of all subsequent changes,
such as changes in surrounding circumstances, in methods of exploitation,
in degree of utilization, etc. The value sought will be the selling price,
assuming a transfer between a willing seller and a willing buyer as of the
particular date. Such factors as the following will be given due considera
tion : (a) character and quality of the timber as determined by species, age,
size, condition, etc.; (b) the quantity of timber per acre, the total quan
tity under consideration, and the location of the timber in question with
reference to other timber; (c) accessibility of the timber (location with
reference to distance from a common carrier, the topography and other
features of the ground upon which the timber stands and over which it
must be transported in process of exploitation, the probable cost of ex
ploitation, and the climate and the state of industrial development of the
locality), and (d) the freight rates by common carrier to important markets.
The timber in question will be valued on its own merits and not on the basis
of general averages for regions; however, the value placed upon it, taking
into consideration such factors as those mentioned above, will be con
sistent with that of the other timber in the region. The commissioner will
give due weight and consideration to any and all facts and evidence having
a bearing on the market value, such as cost, actual sales and transfers of
similar properties, the margin between the cost of production and the price
realized for timber products, market value of stock or shares, royalties
and rentals, value fixed by the owner for the purpose of the capital stock
tax, valuation for local or state taxation, partnership accountings, records
of litigation in which the value of the property has been involved, the
amount at which the property may have been inventoried and (or) appraised
in probate or similar proceedings, disinterested appraisals by approved
methods, and other factors. For depletion purposes the fair market value
at a specified date shall not include any part of the value of the land.
Art. 235. Determination of quantity of timber.—Each taxpayer claiming
or expecting to claim a deduction for depletion is required to estimate with
respect to each separate timber account the total units (feet board-measure
log scale, cords or other units) of timber reasonably known or on good evi
dence believed to have existed on the ground on March 1, 1913, or on the
date of acquisition of the property, as the case may be. This estimate shall
state as nearly as possible the number of units which would have been found
present by a careful estimate made on the specified date with the object of
determining 100% of the quantity of timber which the area would have pro
duced on that date if all of the merchantable timber had been cut and
utilized in accordance with the standards of utilization prevailing in that
region at that time. If subsequently during the ownership of the taxpayer
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making the return, as the net result of the growth of the timber, of changes
in standards of utilization, of losses not otherwise accounted for, of aban
donment of timber, and (or) of errors in the original estimates, there are
found to remain on the ground, available for utilization, more or less units
of timber than remain in the timber account or accounts, a new estimate
of the recoverable units of timber (but not of the cost or the fair market
value at a specified date) shall be made, and, when made, shall thereafter
constitute a basis for depletion.
Art. 236. Aggregate timber and land for purposes of valuation and
accounting.—With a view to logical and reasonable valuation of timber,
the taxpayer shall include his timber in one or more accounts. In general,
each such account shall include all of the taxpayer’s timber which is located
in one “block,” a block being an operation unit which includes all of the
taxpayer’s timber which would logically go to a single given point of manu
facture. In those cases in which the point of manufacture is at a consider
able distance, or in which the logs or other products will probably be sold
in a log or other market, the block may be a logging unit which includes
all of the taxpayer’s timber which would logically be removed by a single
logging development. In exceptional cases, provided there are good and
substantial reasons, and subject to approval or revision by the commissioner
on audit, the taxpayer may divide the timber in a given block into two or
more accounts, e. g., timber owned on February 28, 1913, and that purchased
subsequently may be kept in separate accounts, or timber owned on Feb
ruary 28, 1913, and the timber purchased since that date in several distinct
transactions may be kept in several distinct accounts, or individual tree
species or groups of tree species may be carried in distinct accounts, or
special timber products may be carried in distinct accounts, or blocks may be
divided into two or more accounts based on the character of the timber
and (or) its accessibility, or scattered tracts may be included in separate
accounts. When such a division is made, a proper portion of the total
value or cost, as the case may be, shall be allocated to each account.
The timber accounts mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall not in
clude any part of the value or cost, as the case may be, of the land. In a
manner similar to that prescribed in the foregoing part of this article the
land in a given “block” may be carried in a single land account or may be
divided into two or more accounts on the basis of its character and (or)
accessibility. When such a division is made, a proper portion of the total
value or cost, as the case may be, will be allocated to each account.
The total value or total cost, as the case may be, of land and timber
shall be equitably allocated to the timber and land accounts, respectively.
Each of the several land and timber accounts carried on the books of
the taxpayer shall be definitely described as to their location on the ground
either by maps or by legal descriptions.
For good and substantial reasons to be approved by the commissioner,
or as required by the commissioner, the timber or the land accounts may
be readjusted by dividing individual accounts by combining two or more
accounts, or by dividing and recombining accounts.
Art. 237. Timber depletion and depreciation accounts on books.—
Every taxpayer claiming, or expecting to claim, a deduction for depletion
and (or) depreciation of timber property (including plants, improvements
and equipment used in connection therewith), shall keep accurate ledger
accounts in which shall be charged the fair market value as of March 1,
1913, or the cost, as the case may be, of (a) the property, and (b) the
plants, improvements and equipment, together with such amounts subse
quently expended for the administration, protection, and other carrying
charges, or development of the property or additions to plant and equip
ment as are not chargeable to current operating expenses. (See arts. 231
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and 236.) In such accounts there shall be set up separately the quantity of
timber, the quantity of land, and the quantity of other resources, if any,
and a proper part of the total value or cost shall be allocated to each. (See
art. 236.) These accounts shall be credited with the amount of the de
preciation and depletion deductions claimed and allowed each year, or the
amount of the depreciation and depletion shall be credited to depletion and
depreciation reserve accounts, to the end that when the sum of the credits
for depletion and depreciation equals the value or cost of the property, plus
the amount added thereto for administration, protection, and other carrying
charges, or development or for additional plant and equipment, less salvage
value of the physical property, no further deduction for depletion and de
preciation will be allowed.

(T. D. 3078, October 13, 1920)
Income tax—Decision of court
Corporation excise and income taxes—Acts of August 5, 1909, and
October 3, 1913
1. Gross Income of Insurance Companies—Premium Receipts.
The premium receipts of “every insurance company” by whatever name
they are called are, unless specifically exempted by the terms of the taxing
statutes in question, a part of such company’s gross income.

2.

Same—Premium Deposits.
Premium deposits made in advance by members of a mutual insurance
company to cover estimated losses and expenses are, so long as the payment
thereof constitutes the consideration for contract of insurance, insurance pre
miums constituting gross income of the company.
Same—Interest on Bank Balances and Profits from Investment of Pre
mium Deposits.
Moneys received by way of interest upon bank balances and from invest
ment of such portion of premium deposits as are not currently required for
the payment of losses and expenses are profits earned by an insurance com
pany subject to tax.

3.

Mutual Fire Insurance Companies—Corporation Coming Within Mean
ing of.
A corporation, organized to insure its members, limited to jewelers and
dealers in goods ordinarily in the jewelry trade against loss or damage by
fire, theft, barraty, embezzlement and transportation, which requires each
member to deposit in advance a definite sum sufficient to cover estimated
losses and expenses for the ensuing year, the balance of such deposits being
returned to members, is a mutual fire insurance company and subject to the
taxes imposed by the acts of August 5, 1909, and October 3, 1913.
The appended decision, dated July 19, 1920, of the United States district
court for the southern district of New York, on the cases of Jewelers
Safety Fund Society v. Lowe, collector, and Jewelers Safety Fund Society
v. Anderson, collector, is published for the information of internal revenue
officers and others concerned.

4.

District Court

United States for the Southern District of
New York
Jewelers Safety Fund Society, plaintiff, v. John Z. Lowe, Jr., collector of
internal revenue, defendant, and Jewelers Safety Fund Society, plain
tiff, v. Charles W. Anderson, collector of internal revenue, defendant.
Upon demurrer to the complaint on the ground that it does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action
Knox, District Judge: The premium receipts of “every insurance com
pany” are, unless specifically exempted by the terms of the taxing statutes
of the
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in question, a part of such company's gross income, and, as such, are to be
accounted for. (Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lederer, No. 499, supreme
court of the United States, decided April 19, 1920.)
It makes no difference by what name the premiums are called so long
as the payment thereof constitutes the consideration for the insurance con
tract. Now, that is precisely the function performed by the co-called de
posits made with the plaintiff company by the persons who enjoy the pro
tection of its policies. That such deposits are in excess of the probable cost
of, and loss incident to, the risk of the insurance written by the company
does not change the character of the payments. In other words, the
deposits are at all times while in the possession of the company subject to
application to its expenses and losses. That the entire sum may not be
required for such purposes is but an incident of the nature of the company
and its good fortune in not being subjected to unusual losses and the con
sequent depletion of the funds applicable to the payment thereof. If there
were any doubt as to the nature of the deposit it should be resolved against
the company by reason of the provisions of section G, subdivision (b), of
the act of October 3, 1913. There, deposits, of the same nature as the
deposits here made, are designed “premium deposits.” See also Union Ins.
Co. v. Hoge (21 How., 35).
I think it altogether clear that the plaintiff is not within any of the classes
of companies and organizations which, under the taxing acts of 1909 and
1913, enjoy entire freedom from liability to taxation. Unless, therefore, it
may be held that under some portion of the statute of 1913 the plaintiff is
the beneficiary of a partial immunity from taxation, it must be liable therefor
upon its entire net income to be ascertained as the act declares. Taxation
upon such basis would, however, considering the nature of plaintiff’s organ
ization and its method of doing business (viz, the maintenance on hand of
a large margin between estimated probable losses and those reasonably
possible), result in a series of inconsistent and inequitable tax assessments,
and in making exceptions as to the method of determining net income as to
certain mutual insurance companies the congress proceeded with its legisla
tion along a very definite and logical line. We observe as a result the
proviso contained in subdivision (b) of section G.
Passing, now, to other sources of income possessed by the plaintiff, it is
found that it receives money by way of interest upon bank deposits and
from the investment of such portion of its premium deposits as are not
currently required for losses and expenses. The yield thus accruing to the
plaintiff ultimately reduces the cost of insurance to those holding policies.
In other words, the company earns a profit by means of its management
and control of the premium deposits. Such profit is subject to tax under
the authority of Penn Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lederer, supra. Further
more, if the plaintiff is a mutual fire insurance company under subdivision
(b) of the 1913 act, the yield, from bank balances and investments made, by
the terms of such subdivision may be said to be specifically subject to tax.
The plaintiff was chartered by a special act of the New York state
legislature. Section 2 of the act of incorporation authorizes the society
to insure manufacturers or importers of, and wholesale or retail dealers in,
watches, * * * jewelry, diamonds, and similar articles against loss or
damage thereto by any and all risks of fire, theft, barratry and embezzlement,
and any and all risks of transportation by land or water. With this delega
tion of power I fail to see why the plaintiff is any less a mutual fire insur
ance company because of the fact that in addition to writing insurance upon
the mutual plan against fire risks, it insures, likewise on the mutual plan,
against the risk of theft, embezzlement, transportation and other hazards.
It may be true, as suggested by counsel for plaintiff, that this society
would not be described as a fire insurance corporation under the general
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insurance law of the state; but I believe it may fairly be said that were the
insured of this society not limited to jewelers and those dealing in goods
ordinarily carried in the jewelry trade, the company might very properly
be so described. Certainly it is no more inconsistent to call this company
a mutual fire insurance corporation than it would be (as does the New York
statute) to so call a company which, upon the mutual plan, insures not only
against risks by fire but also against risks of lightning, windstorm, tornado,
cyclone, earthquake, hail, frost or snow.
I suppose that, generally speaking, life, fire and marine insurance are the
most distinctive branches of indemnity underwriting. Practically all of
such companies now insure against other hazards than death, fire and marine
disaster, but the distinctive character of such companies is not altogether
obliterated for that reason. I consequently am of opinion that when in 1913
congress made a special proviso with respect to mutual fire insurance com
panies, its intent and purpose was quite sufficient to include the plaintiff
company within such designation.
Reaching, as I do, the aforementioned conclusion, it follows that after
taking advantage of all deductions from gross income which the law permits
the plaintiff, there still remained to the plaintiff for the years 1912, 1913,
1914 and 1915, under the statutes then in force, an amount of gross income
subject to taxation.
The demurrer to each of the complaints will be sustained.
(T. D. 3080, October 19, 1920)
Income tax—Excess profits taxes—Decision of court

Partnership—Single Trade or Business.
In determining liability under section 209 of the act of October 3, 1917,
income derived from a single timber-land deal by a partnership, whose
principal business is dealing in lumber, cannot, by reason of section 201 of
the act, be considered and treated separate and apart from other partnership
income or profits.

1.

“Invested Capital” Defined.
The term “invested capital,” as used in section 209 of the act of October
3, 1917, includes all working capital consisting of money or property em
ployed in the business or for its benefit, and furnished or paid in by one or
more of the partners.

2.

Partnership—Rate of Assessment Where Having Invested Capital.
Where, during the year 1917, a partnership had invested capital, as above
defined, more than nominal in amount, excess profits taxes upon its income
could not be assessed at the lower rate provided by section 209 of the act of
October 3, 1917.

3.

Partnership—Objection to Method of Determining Invested Capital.
A partnership which had invested capital more than nominal in amount
cannot complain of regulations promulgated or of the method employed in
determining the amount of such capital, where the arbitrary or supposititious
invested capital fixed upon was larger in amount than the invested capital
actually possessed and employed, and the taxes imposed were correspondingly
diminished.

4.

Partnership—Brokers.
Members of a partnership who are paid neither a salary nor commissions
for their services, but who buy and sell lumber and undertake and assume
all the risks and enjoy all the benefits of a merchandising business, employing
a large amount of capital, are not brokers.
5.
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Partnership—Property Pledged as Collateral Security as Part of In
vested Capital.
Property of member of partnership deposited with bank and pledged as
collateral security for the repayment of a loan by or for the benefit of the
partnership in pursuance of the articles of partnership is part of the invested
capital of such partnership.
The appended decision of the district court of the United States for the
western district of Michigan, southern division, in the case of CartierHolland Lumber Co., a partnership, v. Doyle, collector, rendered August 7,
1920, is published not as a ruling but for the information of internal revenue
officers and others concerned.

6.

District Court of

the

United States, Western District of Michigan,
Southern Division

Charles E. Cartier and Edward M. Holland, copartners, doing business under
the firm name and style of Cartier-Holland Lumber Co., plaintiffs, v.
Emanuel J. Doyle, collector, defendant.
Sessions, District Judge: Cartier-Holland Lumber Co. is a partnership,
composed of Charles E. Cartier and Edward M. Holland, engaged in the
business of buying, selling and dealing in timber, lumber and other forest
products. The net income or profits of the firm during the taxable year 1917
amounted to $47,018. Of this sum, $20,353 resulted from an isolated sale
of timbered land and the balance from the regular or customary lumber
business of the partnership. The company has never owned any lands,
timber, plant, mill or yard, and has never done any manufacturing or car
ried any stock of manufactured lumber. Its principal business consisted of
buying lumber from manufacturers and reselling the same to its own cus
tomers. The business was conducted by the partners personally, with the
assistance of a small clerical office force, one bookkeeper and two stenog
raphers. Since its organization in 1912, the firm has at all times been a
heavy borrower of money. According to its books, on January 1, 1917, the
company’s indebtedness to banks for borrowed money was the sum of
$36,300, and its other indebtedness, presumably for lumber purchased,
amounted to $12,309.22, making a total indebtedness of $48,609.22; its
accounts and bills receivable, probably representing lumber sold, aggregated
$39,281.72, and its other assets, including petty cash, office furniture, in
surance paid, and cash in bank, amounted to the sum of $2,108.65, making
a total of assets of $41,390.37. In other words, at the beginning of the tax
able year, the liabilities of the firm exceeded its assets by the sum of
$7,218.85. The account of each member of the firm was then several
thousand dollars overdrawn. At the end of the year 1917, the firm assets
exceeded its liabilities by nearly $14,000, which consisted entirely of profits
made during the taxable year.
Plaintiff’s articles of agreement of copartnership contained the following
provision:
The paid-in capital of the partnership is to be thirty thousand dollars
($30,000), all or any portion of which amount is to be furnished to the
partnership by above named Charles E. Cartier, as the requirements of the
partnership appear, and upon the note or notes of such partnership; such
note or notes not to be made transferable nor made items of record. Such
notes are to be paid at the earliest practicable opportunity out of the net
earnings of the partnership business, and to bear legal rate of interest.
For a time, in carrying out this provision of the partnership agreement,
plaintiff Cartier borrowed money from the banks upon his own note secured
by collateral and furnished the same to the company. Later, and probably
before January 1, 1917, the agreement was modified and working capital
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was obtained by borrowing money from banks upon firm notes, indorsed by
both members of the firm and secured by collateral furnished by Cartier,
the property so pledged as collateral security in all cases and at all times
being of greater value than the face of the notes. This method was pursued
during the entire year 1917.
Plaintiffs, as copartners, made due return of net income of $47,018 for
the year 1917, and voluntarily paid an excess profits tax, computed at 8%.
in accordance with the provisions of section 209 of Title II of the act of
October 3, 1917, and amounting to $3,761.44. Apparently, their right to a
deduction of $6,000 from the income before computing the tax was inad
vertently overlooked. Thereafter the commissioner of internal revenue,
claiming that plaintiffs were not entitled to the benefit of the provisions of
section 209 of the act of October 3, 1917, but were taxable under the pro
visions of sections 201 and 210 of that act, assessed against them an addi
tional excess profits tax for 1917 amounting to $9,027.46. Plaintiffs paid
the additional tax under protest and have brought this suit for its recovery.
The conclusions reached upon questions of law involved in this case may
be thus summarized:
1. Plaintiff’s contention that, in the assessment of excess profits taxes,
the income derived from the single timber-land deal, amounting to the sum
of $20,353, must be considered and treated by itself and separate and apart
from other partnership income or profits is negatived, in express terms, by
the statute here under consideration:
For the purpose of this title every corporation or partnership not ex
empt under the provisions of this section shall be deemed to be engaged in
business, and all the trades and business in which it is engaged shall be
treated as a single trade or business, and all its income from whatever source
shall be deemed to be received from such trade or business.
(Confessedly the company’s principal business was dealing in lumber, and
under this statute its entire income must be attributed to that business.)
2. If during the year 1917 Cartier-Holland Lumber Company had in
vested capital, within the purview and meaning of that term as employed in
the statute, more than nominal in amount, excess profits taxes upon its
income could not be assessed under the provisions of section 209 of the
statute, and if the amount of such invested capital could not be satisfactorily
determined, excess profits taxes must have been assessed under sections _
201 and 210 in accordance with proper regulations prescribed by the com
missioner of internal revenue. If the lumber company had invested capital
more than nominal in amount, plaintiffs are not in a position to complain of
the regulations promulgated or of the method employed in determining the
amount of the firm’s invested capital which forms the basis of the computa
tion of the taxes, because under the undisputed evidence the arbitrary or
suppositious invested capital fixed upon was larger in amount than the
invested capital actually possessed and employed, and the taxes imposed
were correspondingly diminished. These taxes are assessed upon percentages
of income to invested capital. The larger the capital the smaller the
percentage and resulting tax.
3. Plaintiffs are not brokers within any accepted definition of that term.
They are paid neither a salary nor commissions for their services. They
buy and sell lumber and undertake and assume all the risks and enjoy all
the benefits of a merchandising business. They employ a large amount of
capital; their income is dependent upon their personal services and efforts
only in the same way and to the same extent that the farmer who works
his own farm or the merchant who conducts his own store derives his
income from his individual endeavors.
4. The rights of these parties cannot be made to depend upon nonstatutory classifications, regulations or definitions. The statute applies to
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all trades and businesses without regard to their class or character. While
in doubtful cases departmental regulations may be an aid in construction
and interpretation, they can neither add to nor subtract from plain con
gressional enactments. In this instance differences in the meaning of the
terms “invested capital” and “capital” are wholly immaterial. If CartierHolland Lumber Company had any invested capital, it was substantial and
not merely nominal, and plaintiffs must fail. On the other hand, if the
company had no invested capital, plaintiffs are entitled to recover, regardless
of the amount of its borrowed or other non-invested capital.
That the partnership was doing business upon borrowed money is beyond
dispute, and that invested capital does not include borrowed money is settled
by the express terms of the statute, but it by no means follows that plain
tiffs are right in their contentions. The term “invested capital” as here
used includes all working capital, consisting of money or property employed
in the business or for its benefit and furnished or “paid in” by one or more
of the partners. Applying this test, it is clear that this partnership had
invested capital within the purview and meaning of the statute. In the
determination of this question, money borrowed from banks or individuals
other than members of the firm and solely upon the credit of the firm must
be excluded and may not be considered; and, for the purpose of this de
cision, it is unnecessary to determine whether, as claimed by counsel for
defendant, money borrowed upon the notes of the firm, indorsed by the
individual partners, and largely, if not wholly, upon the credit of the latter,
is to be deemed invested capital of the partnership. If the original partner
ship agreement had been carried out and performed, it would not be claimed
that the moneys paid in and furnished by plaintiff Cartier, in accordance
with its terms, would not constitute invested capital of the firm, without
regard to the manner in which or the source from which such moneys were
obtained by him. The method or plan adopted and used in 1917 was a
change in form rather than in substance. The evidence shows conclusively
that for every dollar of money borrowed from the bank property of one of
the members of this firm exceeding in value the amount of the loans was
deposited with the bank and pledged as collateral security for the repay
ment of such borrowed money. The property so furnished and pledged
became a part of the working capital, and was used and employed in the
business of the company to the same extent as if it had been paid directly
into the firm treasury.
Judgment will be entered for defendant, with costs of suit to be taxed.
(T. D. 3082, October 20, 1920)
Income tax
Gross income defined—Inclusions—Article 42, regulations No. 45, amended

Article 42 of regulations No. 45 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 42. Sale of personal property on instalment plan.—Dealers in per
sonal property ordinarily sell either for cash or on the personal credit of the
buyer or on the instalment plan. Occasionally a fourth type of sale is met
with, in which the buyer makes an initial payment of such a substantial
nature (for example, a payment of more than 25%) that the sale, though
involving deferred payments, is not one on the instalment plan. In sales on
personal credit, and in the substantial payment type just mentioned, obliga
tions of purchasers are to be regarded as the equivalent of cash, but a dif
ferent rule applies to sales on the instalment plan. Dealers in personal
property who sell on the instalment plan usually adopt one of four ways
of protecting themselves in case of default: (a) through an agreement that
title is to remain in the seller until the buyer has completely performed his
part of the transaction; (b) by a form of contract in which title is con

452

Income-tax Department
veyed to the purchaser immediately, but subject to a lien for the unpaid
portion of the purchase price; (c) by a present transfer of title to the
purchaser, who at the same time executes a reconveyance in the form of a
chattel mortgage to the seller; or (d) by conveyance to a trustee pending
performance of the contract and subject to its provisions. The general
purpose and effect being the same in all of these plans, it is desirable that a
uniformly applicable rule be established. The rule prescribed is that in the
sale or contract for sale of personal property on the instalment plan, whether
or not title remains in the vendor until the property is fully paid for, the
income to be returned by the vendor will be that proportion of each in
stalment payment which the gross profit to be realized when the property
is paid for bears to the gross contract price. Such income may be ascer
tained by taking as profit that proportion of the total cash collections re
ceived in the taxable year from instalment sales (such collections being
allocated to the year against the sales of which they apply), which the annual
gross profit to be realized on the total instalment sales made during each
year bears to the gross contract price of all such sales made during that
respective year. In any case where the gross profit to be realized on a sale
or contract for sale of personal property has been reported as income for
the year in which the transaction occurred, and a change is made to the
instalment plan of computing net income, no part of any instalment pay
ment received subsequently to the change, representing income previously
reported on account of such transaction, should be reported as income for
the year in which the instalment payment is received; the intent and purpose
of this provision is that where the entire profit from instalment sales has
been included in gross income for the year in which the sale was made, no
part of the instalment payments received subsequently on account of such
previous sales shall again be subject to tax for the year or years in which
received. Where the taxpayer makes a change to this method of computing
net income his balance-sheet should be adjusted conformably. If for any
reason the vendee defaults in any of his instalment payments, and the
vendor repossesses the property, the entire amount received on instalment
payments, less the profit already returned, will be income of the vendor
for the year in which the property was repossessed, and the property re
possessed must be included in the inventory at its original cost to himself,
less proper allowance for damage and use, if any. If the vendor chooses as
a matter of consistent practice to treat the obligations of purchasers as the
equivalent of cash, such a course is permissible.

(T. D. 3089, November 6, 1920)
Income tax—Opinion of Attorney General
Allowance for depletion in case of discovery by the taxpayer subsequent to
March 1, 1913—Apportionment between lessor and lessee
1. The deduction for depletion in the case of mines, oil and gas wells,
as the result of discovery on or after March 1, 1913, is allowed only to the
party or parties in possession at the time of the discovery, and not to sub
sequent purchasers.
2. The value which may be set up in the case of the discovery of mines,
oil and gas wells, pursuant to the second proviso of section 234 (a) (9),
revenue act of 1918, to be depleted in accordance with such reasonable rules
and regulations as the commissioner of internal revenue and the secretary of
the treasury may prescribe according to the peculiar conditions in each case,
is, in the case of a lease, to be equitably apportioned between the lessor and
the lessee.
The following opinion, rendered by the acting attorney general, under
date of October 29, 1920, relative to the right of a lessor to share in the
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depletion allowed in the case of mines, oil and gas wells, as the result of
discovery on or after March 1, 1913, is published in full for your informa
tion and guidance:

Justice
Washington, October 29, 1920.
Dear Mr. Secretary : This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of
October 9, 1920, submitting for my opinion the question “whether the value
which may be set up in the case of the discovery of mines, oil or gas wells,
pursuant to the second proviso of section 234 (a) (9), to be depleted in
accordance with such reasonable rules and regulations as the commissioner
and the secretary may make according to the peculiar conditions in each
case, requires that the lessor be permitted a portion of such discovery
value.”
Section 234 (a) (9) of the act of February 24, 1919, provides:
(a) That in computing the net income of a corporation subject to the
tax imposed by section 230 there shall be allowed as deductions:
(9) In the case of mines, oil and gas wells, other natural deposits, and
timber, a reasonable allowance for depletion and for depreciation of improve
ments according to the peculiar conditions in each case, based upon cost,
including cost of development not otherwise deducted: provided, That in
the case of such properties acquired prior to March 1, 1913, the fair market
value of the property (or the taxpayer’s interest therein) on that date shall
be taken in lieu of cost up to that date: provided, further, That in the case
of mines, oil and gas wells, discovered by the taxpayer on or after March 1,
1913, and not acquired as the result of purchase of a proven tract or lease,
where the fair market value of the property is materially disproportionate
to the cost, the depletion allowance shall be based upon the fair market
value of the property at the date of the discovery, or within thirty days
thereafter; such reasonable allowance in all the above cases to be made
under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the commissioner, with the
approval of the secretary. In the case of leases the deductions allowed by
this paragraph shall be equitably apportioned between the lessor and lessee.
This section is properly divisible into two parts; the first part, compris
ing all but the last sentence thereof, deals exclusively with the establishment
of a basis for the determination of allowance for depletion, and the second,
contained in the last sentence alone, apportions the allowance, when same
shall have been determined, between the lessor and the lessee in case of
leases.
The bases for allowances provided for in part I are:
(1) Where the property was acquired after March 1, 1913, as the result
of purchase of a proven tract or lease, the cost, including cost of develop
ment not otherwise deducted, is determinative of the amount of the al
lowance.
(2) Where the property was acquired prior to March 1, 1913, as the
result of the purchase of a proven tract or lease, the fair market value
on March 1, 1913, is to be taken as the basis of the allowance for depletion,
in lieu of cost up to that date.
(3) Where the property was at the time of its acquisition unproven,
and discovery was made thereon after March 1, 1913, the allowance is to be
determined by the fair market value at the date of discovery or within 30
days thereafter, provided that the discovery was made by the party, or
parties, in possession (the taxpayer).
I take it that the phrase “discovered by the taxpayer” must be read with
the phrase “and not acquired as the result of purchase of a proven tract
or lease”; and taken together they mean that if a discovery is made after
March 1, 1913, upon an unproven tract, acquired either before or after that
Department
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date, the allowance is to be determined by the discovery value only where
the discovery was made by the party or parties in possession; that is, only
when no transfers of the tract or lease have intervened between the date of
the discovery and the incidence of the tax. In other words, if A, either
owning or leasing a property, makes discovery thereon after March 1, 1913,
and continues in possession, then the allowance for depletion is to be based
upon the discovery value; but if after discovery made the property is trans
ferred to B, then the cost is determinative of the allowance to B, since
there is “acquisition after March 1, 1913, as the result of purchase of a
proven tract or lease.”
By “discovered by the taxpayer on or after March 1, 1913, and not
acquired as the result of purchase of a proven tract or lease,” congress
intended to provide a basis for determination of what should be the de
pletion allowance, and did not attempt to determine, as between a lessee
and a lessor, which of them should be entitled to the allowance for dis
covery value. That is provided for in the last sentence of the section,
which says that “In the case of leases the deductions allowed by this para
graph shall be equitably apportioned between the lessor and lessee.” Such
interpretation gives effect to all the language of the section, and brings
all parts of it into accord; and under the general rules of construction such
interpretation should be adopted in preference to an interpretation which
results in repugnance. To hold that by the language “discoverd by the
taxpayer” congress intended to give the discovery allowance to the actual
discoverer, and to deny the lessor any part of such allowance on the theory
that the lessee is usually the discoverer, would be repugnant to language
of the latter portion of the section, which in the case of leases equitably
apportions the allowance between lessor and lessee.
My conclusion, therefore, is that “the value which may be set up in the
case of the discovery of mines, oil or gas wells, pursuant to the second
proviso of section 234 (a) (9), to be depleted in accordance with such
reasonable rules and regulations as the commissioner and the secretary may
make according to the peculiar conditions in each case,” requires that the
lessor be permitted a portion of such discovery value.
Respectfully,
Wm. L. Frierson, Acting Attorney General.
Hon. David F. Houston,
Secretary of the Treasury.
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